Suriyakmaps

After 1700 days since Russian-Ukrainian War began Russian Army currently control 93658 Sq Km, which corresponds to 15,52% of Ukraine (19,98% with Crimea Peninsula included): - Donetsk People's Republic controls 21914 Km^2 (82,64% of Donetsk oblast) - Luhansk…

The deployment of Syrian terrorists to Yemen. 🇸🇾🇸🇦🇾🇪
In recent weeks, reports have emerged about the deployment of Syrian troops to Yemen in support of Saudi Arabia to fight against forces in Sanaa.
Previously, the presence of Syrian mercenaries in Yemen has been very limited, consisting mainly of TFSA/SNA members used by Turkey for its interventionist foreign policy—as it did in Libya and Azerbaijan (where the numbers were considerably higher)—as well as Syrian and non-Syrian terrorists affiliated with other groups, some of whom eventually joined AQAP and IS-YP.
In this case, the situation is quite different. Following the terrorists’ rise to power in December 2024, it would be the new STG authorities who would approve the deployment of troops that officially form part of the armed forces, which would imply formal participation in Yemen. It also reduces the likelihood of a Syrian intervention in Lebanon at a time when Damascus is struggling to financially sustain its armed forces.

It took a little bit more because of Jabal Kahbub but there we go... ⌛️

Within the next 48 hours, the Aden forces’ chances of regaining control of Bab el-Mandeb may be over, and the PLC faces the prospect of having the enemy within a stone’s throw of its capital. And yet, Sana’a’s objective is not Aden – not yet, at least. Stay…

Ukrainian-Russian war. Day 1690-1699: 🇺🇦🇷🇺
Situation on Shakhovskoy & Dobropillya fronts: During the last two weeks, Russian Army has made a series of advances north and northeast of Novoandriivka, reaching the Druzhkovskoe mine from that direction. To the east, Russian forces breached the main Ukrainian defense line, advancing beyond the VESCO mine and industrial complex to the vicinity of the Zapadny quarries (from where Ukrainian army continues its infiltration operations), while at least half of the locality of Andrivka has been captured, with clashes reported in the western part.

Gerasimov's statements are shameful—announcing the capture of two large towns while fierce fighting continues there. Then they'll complain if something similar to what happened in Kupiansk occurs. And men are getting insulted with these declarations while are dying on the battlefield so that the leaders can pin medals on themselves. 🇷🇺🇺🇦

Statement issued by the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria. In an extremely dangerous security development, Turkish intelligence services carried out a coordinated security operation today that resulted in the arrest and abduction of Professor Ali Kayali (Miraj…

Therefore, we in the “Islamic Resistance Front in Syria” affirm the following decisions and statements:

First: Condemnation of the infiltration and disinformation campaigns in Lebanon: We warn of the danger that the Lebanese arena may become a permissive environment in terms of security and the media, facilitating the activities of the Damascus regime’s embassy in Beirut, which has gone beyond its diplomatic role to become an active hub for fabricating narratives, persecuting free-thinking individuals, and settling political scores.

Second: Exposing suspicious coordination and its malicious use: We reveal the involvement of these embassy-affiliated groups in direct dealings with Lebanese figures and entities loyal to the regime, and the use of this coordination to launch systematic campaigns of persecution targeting, above all, the children and cadres of the dissolved military apparatus, in retaliation for their positions and history.

Third: We call for extreme caution and vigilance. We urge all former military cadres and personnel, as well as fighters of the free resistance present on Lebanese territory, to exercise the utmost caution, vigilance, and security awareness; not to be misled by rumors or false narratives; and to take the necessary measures to thwart plans for arrest or elimination.

Fourth: Firmness of Position and Principles: These intelligence operations and attempts to betray leaders and tarnish their reputations will not deter the honorable from continuing on their path; rather, they will only strengthen the resolve of the free people to confront the instruments of terrorism, occupation, and treason until rights are fully restored.

God is the protector of steadfastness.
Islamic Resistance Front in Syria
Politburo
October 15, 2026

This new strategy follows two objectives: to contain the Russians until the arrival of autumn, when the rain and mud make it difficult for heavy vehicles to advance, forcing them to use secondary roads and significantly slowing down logistics and operations; and, secondly, to create a propaganda image of victory by portraying infiltration zones as captured territory, which has on other occasions resulted in a fresh surge of external aid to Ukraine to enable it to continue the war. Both objectives seems to have been reached now.

However, the problem lies in the limitations and costs of this new strategy in the long term. The deployment of these reserve troops alleviates the existing problem of understaffed brigades, helps to hold positions, strengthen defences and reduce the strain on existing units, whilst also dispelling the narrative of a shortage of Ukrainian troops that has been repeated for months.
However, the accelerated deployment of troops with little or no experience ultimately loses its saturation effect once there are sufficient numbers of troops on the defending side. This substantially increases the attackers’ casualties (this year the Ukrainians have suffered heavy losses in these local counter-offensives) and leaves a gap in the rear ranks of personnel who are key to resupplying the troops at the front; consequently, in the long term, the overall situation at the front would not only fail to improve but would actually worsen, especially given that this year the Russians have managed to establish drone supremacy across much of the front lines.

And the impact is not only military, but also social, as there are currently reservists on the front line who were forcibly conscripted; consequently, a rise in casualties amongst these inexperienced troops – deployed to achieve political and media objectives (without this guaranteeing progress towards a victory, as Zelenskyy seeks) – will have a negative effect by increasing draft evasion and fuelling further social unrest on the streets of Ukraine. 🇺🇦🇷🇺

The Ukrainian rear guard springs into action. 🇺🇦
There has been talk in recent days of Starlink’s temporary restrictions on Ukrainian forces, which affected the Ukrainians’ communications and logistics for a relatively short period. This recent incident highlights the strategic dependence on a system largely controlled by the US and the vulnerability to political or technical decisions, particularly as, unlike Russia, Ukraine is not developing alternatives in the event of a service blockade.
Drones have been key to maintaining a relative balance on the front lines, preventing the Russians from making major advances as they did in 2024 and 2025; and with the loss of Starlink for the Russians, the Ukrainians have managed to turn the situation around, halting the Russian advance and even going on the offensive.

How has this been possible? The recruitment situation in Ukraine is critical due to a chronic shortage of combat troops, social tensions and reforms aimed at improving incentives and attracting more personnel, both Ukrainian and foreign. Kyrylo Budanov (Head of the Presidential Office) stated in August 2026 that Ukraine cannot mobilise fewer than 30,000 people per month to maintain the current strength of the Armed Forces (estimated at between 880,000 and 1 million personnel). Not all of these forces are deployed on the front line (approximately 250,000–350,000 personnel), whilst the remainder are assigned to logistics, administration, headquarters and the National Guard, Territorial Defence, training, medical recovery or support roles.
In fact, barely a third of those mobilised each month actually reach the front line. Theoretically, this would allow the rotation rate to be maintained and troops to recover over time, although in the long term the situation would generally worsen for the Ukrainian side and, of course, it would not allow them to launch counter-attacks on more than one front.

December 2025 saw a substantial shift in this dynamic, with a higher proportion of troops from the rear being sent to the front lines. With Mykhailo Fedorov as the new minister in January 2026 and Oleksandr Syrskyi as commander-in-chief, it was decided to send part of this reserve of soldiers – who had little experience or combat skills – to the front to overwhelm the Russian forces, which were already stretched thin, through infiltration operations to force their withdrawal, in this way, the experienced units are tasked with clearing the rear and securing the abandoned Russian positions whilst the infiltrations by the reserves continue to force the Russians to focus on them and abandon any counter-attack. The most notable aspect of this strategy is that it has been carried out under a defence minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, who is an advocate of modernisation and the supremacy of drones (followed by next minister Yevhenii Khmara). And even following Syrskyi’s dismissal in July by Mykhailo Drapatyi—who is apparently inclined to minimise casualties—this strategy has not only continued but has been strengthened, alongside greater decentralisation of management, increased autonomy for commanders and the extension of rotation periods (this has led to an increase in the number of reservists at the front over the last two to three months).

The results have been evident on several fronts:
- Dnipropetrovsk and southern Donetsk, where the Ukrainians have managed to reverse many of the Russian advances made in 2025 in the former oblast and have recaptured the town of Komar.
- Stalling Russian offensive capabilities in Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka and east of Kramtorsk and Sloviansk, forcing a Russian withdrawal around the waterway (due to Drapatyi’s extensive rotations).
- The repulsion of the Russian offensive in Lyman and the surrounding area (though not Operation Vivaldi, carried out by experienced Ukrainian troops).
- The maintenance of the pockets east of the Oskil and south of Kupiansk.